

**THE DUTY OF THE FIRM IN SELLING TO THE POOR:
A QUESTION OF PERSON, JUSTICE, AND SUBSIDIARITY**

by

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Mainstream economists, including most especially neo-classical economists, simply do not address the question of the duty of the firm in selling to the poor. To them the issue is strictly normative, and they have taken considerable pains to delimit economics as a positive discipline. They carefully separate value and fact, and engage themselves professionally in answering questions relating to *what is* and not *what should be*. Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman offers an argument that helps reassure them in their professional comfort zone.

The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and labor leaders have a “social responsibility” that goes beyond serving the interest of their stockholders or their members. This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In such an economy, *there is one and only one social responsibility of business* -- to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays with the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud [Friedman, p. 133; emphasis added].

Forensic economists hold a somewhat different view at least in general and, if not for ethical reasons, at least for very practical reasons. Firms are being held liable for damages due not just to deception and fraud, as Friedman argues, but to negligence as well, and state and federal governments have consumer protection agencies to examine specific cases involving the duty of the firm well beyond matters relating to deception and fraud.

Social economists reject Friedman’s argument based on libertarianism and individualism that the private firm has only the one purpose of increasing shareholder value. Social economists view the firm as having several constituencies -- shareholders, managers, workers, customers, suppliers, neighbors, partners -- and duties associated with each one. Those duties may or may not be expressed in statutory law, but ultimately are grounded in the simple language of the virtue of justice -- to render to another that which is owed. The firm has a duty, for example, to its customers, its suppliers, and its employees deriving from the principle of equivalence. It has another duty to its shareholders and employees deriving from the principle of distributive justice. Also it has an obligation to its competitors and neighbors based on the principle of contributive justice. See the appendix for more on each of these three principles of economic justice.

The duty of the firm may not always be clear before the fact or even afterwards. Whether the firm understands its duty well or not, it has a duty to its customers which may become clearer with the passage of time and with widespread use of the product, such as with silicon gel implants, tobacco, thalidomide, asbestos, riding lawnmowers, and lead-based paint. “Caveat emptor” no longer suffices to fully discharge the duty of the firm, nor does the “invisible hand” make all things right.

This duty includes continuous monitoring of product utilization to assure that it is safe under normal use, and to warn customers as to dangerous uses. Put simply, the firm has an obvious obligation in principle to do no harm. Systematic failure to fulfill this duty transforms the firm into a unit in the social order whose dysfunctioning is not only an injustice but also a burden to others in society. To illustrate, by deceiving the general public about the addictive characteristics of cigarette

smoking, and by manipulating the young into taking up the habit through clever advertising, tobacco companies have imposed a huge cost on the health-care system in dealing with the life-threatening consequences of cigarette use. Even when the outcomes are far less consequential, the firm's failing in its duty to its customers over time erodes the trust between producers and consumers which is necessary for normal commerce, particularly for firms that rely on repeat business. The gains from "ripping off" are not likely to last, and therefore are a flimsy foundation upon which to build the firm's future. The firm can claim no right to disrupt the social order.

The question arises as to whether the firm has a *special* duty in selling to the poor. Over the years, supermarkets, landlords, liquor stores, retail jewelers, mortgage bankers, insurance companies, clothing stores, and more recently the gaming business have been accused of numerous abuses of the poor such as price gouging, false and misleading promotions and advertising, denial of access, bait and switch practices, inflated credit sales, to name several. In what follows we argue that the firm has a *special* duty in selling to the poor which is grounded in the person of the one who is poor, in the three principles of economic justice, and in the principle of subsidiarity. See the appendix for more on the principle of subsidiarity.

Contemporary conventional economics addresses poverty completely apart from consumer behavior as if the two were unrelated [O'Boyle 1993, pp. 13-26]. We propose herein to bring the two together and in so doing help throw some additional light on the question of the duty of the firm in selling to the poor.

PERSON

Social economics views the consumer along two dimensions of his/her nature -- individuality and sociality. Mainstream economics, on the other hand, sees the consumer along just the one dimension of human individuality. Accordingly, the focus of attention in mainstream economics is the individual -- homo-economicus -- who is valued strictly as a means to an end. Increasingly the focus of attention in social economics is the person -- homo *socio-economicus* -- who quite apart from any instrumental value is valued ultimately as an end *per se*. This difference in human valuation shows up in matters relating to the poor. In instrumental terms, the impoverished are less important than the well-to-do. In personalist terms, those who are poor are no less valued than those who are not, and as persons both have value beyond measure. The social economics view of the consumer as a person is consistent with and reinforces the conviction that all humans are created equal. The conventional economics view of the consumer as an individual is not; here the dominant social value is individual freedom.

Human Individuality.

Because humans are individual beings, consumers characteristically are unique, solitary, autonomous, self-centered, and self-made, and they display those characteristics in matter-of-fact manner in the marketplace. The fitting of jackets and pants evidences their uniqueness as does the monogramming of their shirts. The quiet reading of a book and driving of a car without companions point to the solitariness of the individual consumer. The rebellious clothing, makeup, and hair styles

of teenagers reflect their need as individuals for autonomy. Their well-known self-absorption is an extreme form of self-centeredness which normally moderates as they grow older but may never disappear. The strong interest in foods that are healthy and nutritious and with fitness equipment to sculpt the body are indicators of our human materiality and emphasize that we are truly self-made creatures.

Furthermore, by virtue of their free will and intellect, human beings as consumers functioning in a market economy are free to choose within limits both the wants that are to be satisfied and the needs that are to be met. They use this freedom wisely and demonstrate their rationality whenever satisfying a want does not interfere with meeting a need. Need, in other words, is an object of the intellect, a thing primarily to be known, and required for existence. Want, in contrast, is an object of the will, a thing principally to be sought after, and desired for its own sake. One cannot address the issue of poverty without first differentiating need and want (taken up in the following section). Indeed, fundamental differences notwithstanding, both the absolute standard of poverty and the relative standard are based squarely on human physical need.

The individuality of all human beings means that, even though need proceeds from the materiality of human nature and in a general sense is the same for all, need in a specific sense is different from one person to another. What constitutes a need for one person may be a want for another, such as the nearsighted person who needs eyeglasses as compared with the person with no vision problem who wants eyeglasses as a fashion statement. Some persons do not want what others in the same circumstances regard as needed, as with car seats for infants or hearing aids. There are even instances when a thing simultaneously meets a need and satisfies a want. A baseball cap may be needed for the protection it provides from the sun and at the same time (perhaps worn backwards) it is desired for the message it sends to one's peers or boss. Further, the needs and wants of any given human being change with the passage of time.

A craving is a want over which some freedom of choice has been lost. In some instances, a craving becomes an addiction, a want over which there is virtually no control. A dependency and an addiction are alike in that both signify a loss of control. They are different in that feeding an addiction, as with the alcoholic, is life-threatening whereas maintaining a dependency, as with the insulin-dependent diabetic, is life-enhancing.

Conventional economics takes all of these -- wants, needs, fads, fashions, cravings, addictions, and dependencies -- and reduces them to human wants/needs and consumer demand. Setting aside need and focusing instead on wants allow mainstreamers to side step the use of value-laden concepts such as human physical need, and to cast consumer behavior in a value-free analytical mold.

In mainstream economics, consumer behavior is represented chiefly as commodity-acquiring, want-satisfying, and utility-maximizing which proceed from the individuality of human beings and reinforce it. By adding the "invisible hand" principle to the philosophy of individualism, mainstream economics argues that the well-being of everyone is served best when each individual pursues

his/her own self-interest. Thus, even without intending it, the individual pursuit of one's own wants satisfaction is the best means to the wants satisfaction of one's neighbors.

Human Sociality.

For more than fifty years in the U.S. and even longer in Europe, a different perspective has been developing in economics as to the adequacy and accuracy of the conventional paradigm. In brief, social economics has emerged to challenge conventional economics across a broad spectrum of economic thought including consumer behavior. One central criticism of mainstream economic thinking emphasizes the dual nature of the consumer as a individual being and a social being with certain human physical needs.¹ Thus, consumers are more than self-centered individual beings rationally allocating constrained budgets to maximize individual utility where, even allowing for altruism, other human beings are seen as instruments more so than persons. Consumers, according to social economics, are other-centered social beings too, making choices in order to satisfy wants and to meet needs where, even allowing for human frailties, other human beings are to be seen as precious persons.

It is our fundamental proposition herein that, based on developments in social economics, our treatment of consumer behavior should reflect the individuality *and* the sociality of the consumer, and that the consumer should be valued ultimately not as a means to be used for someone's satisfaction but as an end in him/herself. We propose, therefore, a replacing of the individualism of mainstream economics with the personalism of social economics. As stated previously, in conventional economics the issue of unmet human physical need or poverty is not adequately integrated with an understanding of consumer behavior.²

The problem with the mainstream paradigm lies at its very foundations. Individualism asserts in effect that human beings as consumers are one dimensional, that humans are individual beings only. In addition, rationality is emphasized to the near exclusion of materiality. In that sense, the consumer conventionally is represented as disembodied, is rational only as to the economic means that satisfy, and is essentially unknowable as to ends. The consumer is regarded as knowing what he/she wants, though ends cannot be posited, and given his/her income uses the market wisely to achieve the maximum satisfaction possible.

Personalism insists that the conventional or mainstream consumer is an incomplete person because the second dimension of human nature -- sociality -- is entirely disregarded. The duality of human nature means that unique, solitary, autonomous, self-centered, and self-made are not the only

¹ See, for example, The Social Economics of Human Material Need [Davis and O'Boyle].

² This article draws upon and extends the author's own remarks made elsewhere [see O'Boyle 1994, pp. 286-313].

traits of the consumer. By virtue of their sociality, consumers also are alike, communal, dependent, other-centered, and culture-bound.

The routine question "What are you wearing?" and the "black-tie" instruction on a dinner invitation underscore that humans desire to be alike. Reading a book aloud to a preschooler and car pooling call to mind our communal nature. The lack of money on the part of teens and a spell of long-term unemployment especially for a primary wage-earner (re-)activate a sense of human dependency. Much of the consumer behavior of mothers and fathers, from trips to McDonalds to saving for college, is other-centered. Catfish and hushpuppies, on the one hand, and brats and beer, on the other, are indicators that consumption is culture-bound. In addition, in terms of marketplace behavior the complete consumer is want-satisfying *and* need-fulfilling, utility-maximizing *and* utility-satisficing, privacy-protecting *and* company-seeking, commodity-acquiring *and* gift-giving.

From the personalist perspective, individuality means that specific goods and services are selected by the individual consumer who looks inward at times (makes intra-personal comparisons) to determine his/her own self-interest and who acts autonomously in order to serve his/her self-interest. From the personalist point of view, sociality means that specific goods and services are chosen by the individual consumer who is constrained by the social environment and looks outward at times (makes inter-personal comparisons) not only to determine and serve his/her own self-interest but also to meet the needs and satisfy the wants of others, especially family members, neighbors, and peers.

Not everyone, however, is fully a social being and fully an individual being at the same time. The consumer who is a conformist, for example, is a human being with too little individuality. The free-rider is a person with too little sociality.

Along both the individual dimension and the social dimension, choices are made rationally and wisely only when the free will follows an intellect that is properly informed. Affection for others as well as fear of others, not to mention compulsiveness and the profoundly powerful emotions originating in human sexuality and reinforced by peer pressure, clearly direct the will and prompt specific consumer choices. Thus, the pure rationality of human beings as consumers is a claim that does not stand under careful examination. See Figure 1 for a summary of the foregoing.

DIFFERENTIATING NEEDS AND WANTS

If the physical need of an individual is fully met even when that individual makes some unwise consumption choices, it is not necessary to differentiate needs from wants unless using a specific good or service to satisfy a given want is dangerous or harmful to either the user or to others. Consumers routinely will attempt to satisfy wants and to meet need. Simply put, with one general exception of the hazardous choice, there is no public issue or social question whenever there is no unmet need.

An estimated 15 percent of the U.S. population is classified as poor. A disproportionately large number -- 14.6 million in 1994 -- are children. It follows, strictly speaking, that 85 percent

have no unmet need. But the poverty population is growing. In 1994 there was a total of 38.1 million poor in the U.S. Fifteen years earlier, there were 26.1 million poor persons [Statistical Abstract, p. 472]. The poverty market is getting bigger, heightening concern for properly defining and understanding the duty of the firm.

If the physical need of an individual is not fully met even when that person has applied his/her financial resources prudently and even when none of the wants satisfied are dangerous or harmful, one must differentiate want from need. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to determine the extent to which society at large should intervene to help meet the need of the person which he/she is not able to meet alone and, most especially for our purposes herein, to determine whether the individual firm in principle has any social responsibility in justice³ to the needy person who acts prudently.

Further, it is necessary to differentiate need from want in cases where the physical need of the individual is not fully met because the available financial resources may have been used instead to satisfy wants, such as to buy designer jeans, gold jewelry, trendy sneakers, junk food. As with the needy person who has used his/her financial resources prudently, the question arises as to whether the individual firm has any social responsibility to help the needy person who behaves imprudently.

In addressing the social responsibility of the firm it is instructive to define the market economy as a set of complex economic institutions to help individuals meet those needs, satisfy those wants, and indulge those whims, fancies, and obsessions which they cannot meet, satisfy, or indulge alone, at the same time preserving the widest possible exercise of personal freedom. If the market economy were able to provision all of these demands, there would be no poverty issue and therefore no social responsibility of this type for the individual firm. The market economy, however, uses the threat of unmet human physical need and relative prices to (re-)allocate resources and for that reason alone there always will be a problem of poverty in a market economy for which the duty of the individual firm is in question.

Unmet physical need is regarded as poverty, while unsatisfied wants, fancies, and cravings and unfed addictions are not, because unmet physical need threatens existence itself whereas the others do not. Failure on the part of society as a whole to respond to physical need that is unmet by the private sector has profound implications for the social values of freedom, equality, and community and thus for the personhood of those in poverty. To illustrate, hunger destroys equality because begging for one's food subordinates the beggar to the provider. Illiteracy destroys community because it impedes the communication that draws men and women together.

Need fulfillment is not a replacement for the want satisfaction. Indeed, it is necessary in general to preserve want satisfaction in a theory of consumer behavior in a market economy because

³ We do not include herein any consideration for an obligation in charity which is entirely different than an obligation in justice.

removing it means restricting freedom of choice and diminishing the individuality of human beings as consumers. Want satisfaction may be represented as the corollary of voluntary unemployment which is preserved in order to assure the freedom of human beings as workers and to protect their individuality.

Poverty attacks the person of the poor by undermining their fundamental of human dignity. By failing or refusing to provide help to these types of needy persons, society as a whole denies that freedom, equality, and community are central social values. As an integral part of human society, does the individual firm have some special social responsibility in justice? We see nothing in the three principles of economic justice that establish a clear and obvious obligation for the firm to act by itself in the matter of poverty, *provided it has done nothing through the normal operations of its business to contribute to the problem.*

JUSTICE, SUBSIDIARITY, AND THE DUTY OF THE FIRM

Just as the individual firm is required to assume responsibility in a variety of circumstances -- for any pollution that attends its normal operations,⁴ for the safety of its workers, for any discrimination in hiring, promoting, and paying its employees, for any product defect that may be harmful to the consumer, to name several -- one can argue along the very same lines in justice that it has some responsibility for any direct, substantial, and harmful effect on human physical need from its marketing activities. Simply put, the firm *is not morally free* to operate in a way that encourages consumers, whether in general they make choices wisely or not, to satisfy a want at the expense of some physical need, especially the need of person who is not able to provide for him/herself directly such as a child or a physically incapacitated adult.

In these circumstances, the duty of the firm is grounded in one instance in the principle of equivalence, the principle of distributive justice, and the personhood of the consumer, and in a second instance in the principle of contributive justice and the principle of subsidiarity.

First, since consumers are persons who are to be affirmed as ends in themselves and not as mere instruments to be used by the firm for its own financial purposes, the firm that is deliberately oblivious to and unconcerned for any harmful effects on human physical need proceeding directly from its own selling activities effectively denies the personhood of the consumer. Further, it violates the principle of equivalence by imposing an unequal burden on the consumer. In its one-on-one relationship with the customer, the firm fails to treat that customer as a person, as an equal. The firm is manipulative.

To elaborate, the burden on the firm in selling to the poor is to transfer the product to the consumer at the point of sale. The burden on the consumer who is poor is not only to pay for the product at the point of sale but to deal with the fact that such a purchase may not meet any human

⁴ The ultimate moral standard by which the danger of any pollution is to be judged is the harmful effects it has on all living things -- the so-called "environment" -- but most especially the harmful effects on human beings who alone in the universe are persons.

physical need because he/she may have been induced instead to use his/her financial resources to satisfy a want. The burdens imposed are disproportionate, not equal as the principle of equivalence demands, and likely become even more disproportionate if the poor consumer has dependent children whose needs also may be denied because an adult consumer has been manipulated into acting unwisely.

A firm operating in this manner also may fail to meet its obligations under the principle of distributive justice which demands that it treat all of its customers as equals. If, so instance, the firm charges its customers who are poor more than it charges other customers for the same product or service, even though its costs are no different, the firm clearly violates distributive justice and victimizes the poor further. In its relationship with all of its customers, the firm treats some worse than others. The firm is discriminatory.

Second, in order to enhance its own profitability, such a firm silently shifts the responsibility for bearing the burden of the unmet physical need it has imposed from itself to the general public including taxpayers and as an member of human society thereby violates the principle of contributive justice which demands that every member contribute to the support and maintenance of human society. A firm that acts in this manner disregards the principle of subsidiarity because it forces the poor to turn elsewhere in the social order for help in meeting their needs, typically to a larger more powerful unit such as a government agency which because of its size and distance from the person seeking help may not render it adequately.

In selling to the poor the firm has a *special* duty under the principle of subsidiarity which it does not have in selling to others. Since customers who the poor may need help from the rest of society for reasons just suggested whereas well-to-do customers do not need such assistance, the principle of subsidiarity -- the principle that deals with providing assistance to those in need -- applies when one is selling to the poor but not to better-circumstanced customers. By violating both the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of contributive justice, the firm *abuses not only the poor but the rest of society as well*. Tobacco companies represent one example of this kind of double abuse.

The duty that the firm has in this regard may be set forth by various means at its disposal. To illustrate, it may be affirmed in the company's mission statement, in its code of ethics, in its operating policies, in the behavior, attitudes, and personal values of the senior management, and notably in its advertising. To be effective, however, the firm must train its employees as to the importance of this obligation and how each one is expected to carry out his/her part of that obligation. In addition, the firm must faithfully monitor its employees on this obligation and must put in place the necessary procedures to enforce compliance. See Figure 1 for a summary of the foregoing.

CLOSING COMMENTS

Several points bear repeating. First, human beings as consumers know the difference between a thing that is needed and a thing that is desired well enough to be able to order their lives as consumers accordingly.

Second, a need and a want are alike in that both are two-dimensional, reflecting the duality of human nature. Human physical needs are definable in absolute terms to incorporate human individuality and in relative terms to exemplify human sociality. Similarly, a want is identified by looking inward to one's own self as an individual being and by looking outward to others as a social being.

Third, wants are constrained by limits that are imposed from within the individual consumer and from without. The mainstream proposition to the contrary is indefensible, unnecessary, and unfortunate.

Fourth, drawing need and wants together, rather than isolating the one from the other, aligns the theory of consumer behavior closer to what is actually happening in the marketplace and the household.

Fifth, the firm has an obligation in economic justice to refrain from selling activities that have a direct, significant, negative impact on human physical need. In equivalence, the firm is admonished about imposing an unequal burden on buyers. In contributive justice, the firm is cautioned not to silently shift the true human cost of its marketing activities to taxpayers who are not involved in the firm's operational decision making. In distributive justice, the firm has a duty to treat its customers the same unless its costs are different for different customers.

Sixth, the firm has a *special* duty under the principle of subsidiarity to its poor customers whom it has induced to spend their limited financial resources in satisfying a want thereby making it more difficult for them to meet their needs. Those poor customers then are forced to turn elsewhere for assistance where the available sources of assistance may not be adequate to the task of meeting those needs. By violating this principle in combination with the principle of contributive justice, the injury done by the firm extends not just to the poor but to the rest of society as well.

Finally, the firm ought to have a special concern for the individuality, sociality, and personhood of the consumer such that it does not leave it entirely to "the invisible hand" to address the issue of poverty or fall back on "caveat emptor" to escape responsibility for substantial, harmful effects on human physical need that derive directly from its operations. The firm cannot perform its duty to the needy without first evaluating its product line in terms meeting needs versus satisfying wants, and honestly addressing the question Are we inducing our poor customers to satisfy a want at the expense of meeting their needs?

APPENDIX

PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE.

The principle of equivalence enjoins a *mutual and two-fold* duty in any exchange involving buyer and seller in the product market, producer and resourceholder in the resource market (including employer and employee in the labor market), and borrower and lender in the financial market. For any exchange between two such parties to meet the demands of justice, both parties are obliged to (1) exchange things of equal value, and (2) impose equal burdens on one another. A common expression for faithfully adhering to the principle of equivalence in the marketplace is: "I got my money's worth." In the workplace a common expression for meeting the demands of this principle is: "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." Today a violation of the principle of equivalence often is referred to as "ripping off." Two specific kinds violations of the principle of equivalence in the marketplace are price gouging (a seller violation) and shoplifting (a buyer violation). In the workplace two specific types of violations are embezzling (an employee violation) and sweatshop conditions (an employer violation). All four violations are illegal because they breach the principle of equivalence. This principle underscores the one-on-one relationship between the two parties in which the two are equals.

PRINCIPLE OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

The principle of contributive justice enjoins a *one-sided and one-dimensional* duty on the individual member of a group. Contributive justice demands that insofar as the individual receives benefits from belonging to a group, that individual has an obligation to maintain and support the group. Virtually every membership organization requires a person to pay dues in order to enjoy the privileges of membership, including the right to vote in organization elections and to receive the publications of the organization. Two common expressions for the faithful practice of the principle of contributive justice in the workplace are "I've paid my dues" and "I've done my fair share." One common practice in the marketplace is forming a queue at the checkout counter and not breaking in front of others who have been waiting their turn. Two specific examples of violations of the principle of contributive justice in the workplace are industrial spying and computer tampering. Two types of violations in the marketplace are insider trading and insurance fraud. All four violations are illegal because they breach the principle of contributive justice. This principle heightens awareness of the duties of the individual member associated with belonging to a group.

PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

The principle of distributive justice enjoins a *one-sided and one-dimensional* duty on the person or organization with greater responsibilities -- the superior -- to his/her/its subordinates. Distributive justice demands that the superior, in this instance the firm, distribute the benefits and burdens among the subordinates (employees, customers, suppliers), in some equal fashion. In

general a failure in this regard is called discrimination or favoritism. One common expression for the faithful practice of distributive justice in the workplace is “equal pay for equal work.” One common expression in the marketplace is “limit three to a customer.” Two specific examples of violations of the principle of distributive justice in the workplace are sexual harassment and hiring/promoting persons who are less qualified than others. Two types of violations in the marketplace are redlining and differential pricing. All four violations are illegal because they breach the principle of distributive justice. This principle emphasizes the duties of the person with supervisory responsibilities in relating to his/her subordinates all of whom are to be treated as equals.

PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY.

The principle of subsidiarity states that larger more powerful units of society, such as the state and the firm, should not usurp the functions of smaller less powerful units, such as the family and the person, but should render help (subsidiuum) so that those smaller less powerful units are able to function effectively. President Lincoln’s formulation of this principle was: “government should do for the people what the people are unable to do for themselves.” In theoretical terms, the principle of subsidiarity reinforces the democratic principle by widening opportunities for smaller less powerful units of society to participate in decision-making processes that bear upon their well-being. In more nearly practical terms, the principle of subsidiarity addresses two major problems: (1) the abuse of the person who applies for assistance who is not truly needy or is not making a good-faith effort to help him/herself, and (2) the abuse of assistance providers who do not properly and respectfully serve the truly needy. By locating the source of assistance as close as possible to the truly needy, the principle of subsidiarity limits the first type of abuse because assistance providers are more likely to actually know the actual circumstances of persons who are applying for help and more likely to accurately differentiate the truly needy from would-be abusers. Similarly, by locating the source of assistance as close as possible to the needy, this principle limits the second type of abuse because it affords the truly needy better access to the administrative channels whereby abusive providers are reported to their superiors.

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