

CENTERING ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ON JUSTICE AND THE PERSON: A VISION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

by

**Edward J. O'Boyle, Ph.D.
Mayo Research Institute**

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**Questions and comments should be directed to:
Edward J. O'Boyle, Ph.D.
Mayo Research Institute
1217 Dean Chapel Road, West Monroe, LA 71291 USA
Tel: 318-396-5779E-mail: edoboyle@earthlink.net**

Social values in economic affairs are like the foundations that support a suspension bridge: out of sight, but absolutely essential. The bridge may collapse if those foundations are improperly built, or are subsequently damaged in, say, a collision or by an earthquake. Similarly, economic affairs may collapse into chaos if the values upon which they rest are eroded gradually or are replaced suddenly. Observe what has happened, for example, in the former Soviet Union over the past ten years as individual freedom has emerged as the dominant social value. Take note of what has taken place in farming in the United States where the values attached by society to the family farm have eroded in favor of other values rooted in the presumed greater economic efficiencies of the corporate farm. Even though the economic dysfunction besetting Russia today is the far more critical of the two, both countries are alike in that both are struggling with a sea-change in social values that has profoundly shaken an entire spectrum of social institutions including the ones by which economic affairs are organized.¹

A social value is a conviction, principle, or ideal which is held widely across society. Among the Irish and Italians, for instance, family or community is a dominant social value. In England, freedom is centrally important; the same can be said for Poland. Among Swedes and the French, equality is a vital social value. Indeed, in France all three of these social values are expressed in the unforgettable “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.”

In a market economy the role of personal values, such a preference for wine with dinner, for a sweater instead of a jacket, for opera versus rock music, is transparent. Personal values may determine the success or failure of a particular product and thereby the fortunes of the firms which make it. Social values, however, are hidden from view in the everyday routine of economic affairs. They become more visible in an economic crisis such as the oil embargo of the 1970s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, or in the aftermath of a great war.

In the modern political order, it is commonplace for social values to be written into a declaration and affirmed in a constitution in order to protect the rights of individuals and to assure that the many individuals are brought successfully into one *political* union. There is a similar need to affirm the social values which unify the many individuals into one *economic* union, especially when those individuals come from several different nations which over the years have faced one another on the battlefield. Václav Havel in 1994 eloquently stated his concern that the Maastricht Treaty and the other documents upon which the European Union is based have not made those values sufficiently transparent.

The European Union is based on a large set of values, with roots in antiquity and in Christianity, which over 2,000 years evolved into what we recognize today as the foundations of modern democracy, the rule of law, and civil society. This set of values has its own clear moral foundation and its obvious metaphysical roots, regardless of whether modern man admits it or not. Thus it cannot be said that the European Union lacks its own spirit from which all the concrete principles on which it is founded grow. It appears, though, that this spirit is rather difficult to see. It seems too hidden behind the mountains of systemic, technical, administrative, economic, monetary and other measures that contain it. And thus, in the end, many people might be left with the understandable impression that the European Union -- to put it a bit crudely -- is no more than endless arguments over how many carrots can be exported from somewhere, who sets the amount, who checks it and who eventually punishes the delinquent who contravenes the

regulations [Havel, pp. 5-6].

Drawing heavily from the public statements of John Paul II, the following is an attempt to help make those values more visible. Centrally important to this vision are two concepts about which John Paul has written extensively: justice and person. The rights and duties set forth herein derive from these two concepts, and are intertwined with them. Indeed, there is no justice without rights which are respected and duties which are lived, and human beings are not fully persons if their rights are not affirmed. Further, while rights and duties may be expressed somewhat differently from one cultural setting to the next, they are the same in principle for all.

ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES

Economic affairs center around four main processes: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption.² These four processes, in turn, are unified into a single system by the three organizing principles of competition, cooperation, and intervention.³ Competition and cooperation are alike in that both organize production, distribution, exchange, and consumption in an *activating* mode. In contrast, intervention operates in a *limiting* mode. To explain, a football match is activated by the competitive forces of the teams involved and by the cooperative energies of the individual members of each team. The match is limited by the intervention of the referees, notably when one player fouls another, to assure a safe and fair contest.

There are *two* activating principles because there are only two ways to decide how economic affairs are to be organized. Economic decisions can be made by individuals acting independently (the *many*), or by acting together (the *one*). In market economies, group decision making may be either private or public, with private groups generally preferred as against public groups. Trade unions and professional associations are examples of private-group decision making. City councils and national legislatures are examples of public group decision making.

There are just *two* decision making methods because of the duality of human nature. Every human being is at once an individual being and a social being. Thus, by nature human beings in the conduct of their everyday affairs may chose to act as *many* separate individuals, or to come together and act as *one*. The choices they make determine the specific institutions constructed to carry out the four processes of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption.

Market economies use both competition and cooperation to activate economic affairs, but not always to the same degree. In the United States, competition drives economic affairs more forcefully than does cooperation. In Japan, there is a greater balance between these two activating forces. A command economy, on the other hand, is more reliant on group intervention through public ownership and control of economic resources. A command economy in principle depends on the single engine of cooperation to activate economic affairs, meaning that whenever that engine fails the economy is plunged into chaos just as with a single-engine aircraft when it loses power.⁴ Continuing this analogy, just as a twin-engine aircraft flies faster, higher, and is capable of carrying a heavier payload on two operating engines, a market economy functions more effectively with the dual engines of competition and cooperation operating in tandem.

SOCIAL VALUES UNDERLYING COMPETITION, COOPERATION, AND INTERVENTION

Each one of the three organizing principles rests on its own social value. Competition rests on the social value of individual freedom. Cooperation is built on the social value of community or family. Intervention is based on the social value of equality. Thus, in order to utilize competition to organize economic affairs there first must be widespread acceptance of the social value of individual freedom. And, indeed, we have seen the change toward individual freedom and competition take place most dramatically in Eastern and Central Europe since the late 1980s.

The Japanese and South Korean economies have expanded very rapidly over the years significantly because the value attached to family and community in their societies allows wider use of the activating principle of cooperation, although some in the West are critical of certain economic practices in Japan and Korea as collusive. The economic system of the Soviet Union, which had been based primarily on cooperation-community and on intervention-equality (given expression, for instance, in the institutions of collective farming and central planning), collapsed when it became abundantly clear that the economies of the West, which relied more heavily on competition and individual freedom, were much better able to meet the needs and satisfy the wants of their populations.

Expanded individual freedom drives production by summoning up and applying greater competitive energies in the workplace and the marketplace. Economic success in turn nourishes self-confidence, especially among the young, which subsequently evokes from individuals even more competitive energies which then are channeled into the marketplace and the workplace, generating even more economic success. Fittingly, John Maynard Keynes referred to these energies as “animal spirits” which he described as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” and without which “business enterprise fades and dies” [Keynes, pp. 161-162].

Expectations are heightened too. That is, the success which the Irish, for instance, have been experiencing over the past 20 years is fuelling a sense that the economy will continue to grow and develop in the years ahead, especially as Ireland becomes more fully integrated into the economies of continental Europe. For the young in particular, heightened expectations mean that they can plan on having a higher standard of living than their parents.

Progress in a market economy, however, comes at a price. More often than not, new businesses fail rather than succeed, and with the closing of these enterprises, the economic security of many of those associated with them as owners, workers, suppliers, or creditors disintegrates. The harsh reality of a highly competitive, highly individualistic economy is that successful new enterprises replace old established ones in a process which Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” In other words, economic growth and development in market economies such as Spain and Italy spell failure and less economic security for some at the very same time they bring success and more economic security for others.

Rapid economic growth and development frequently mean a severe strain on the infrastructure -- schools, highways, parking, water and sewage treatment, parks, and so on --

which does not expand sufficiently and in time to accommodate the emerging private-sector demand. It is instructive to see the infrastructure as a modern *commons*⁵ -- resources open to use by everyone and subject to certain restraints such as speed limits to control abuse (the so-called “tragedy of the commons” -- because a commons is a reminder that economic growth and development in a market economy depend on *coordinated individual and group decision making*).

In addition, a more intense, competitive economic environment means that in everyday marketplace and workplace interactions ordinary people will tend to see one another more as rivals and adversaries and less as neighbors and friends. This transformation is observable across the business cycle. In economic expansion, humans are pitted against one another for a piece of an expanding economy and the new opportunities that flow from it. In contraction, they confront one another to determine whose job or business will shoulder the burden of an economy in decline. Anxiety is part and parcel of economic affairs in market economies.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MARKET ECONOMIES: RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER ECONOMIC JUSTICE

The price for driving economic affairs more aggressively on the basis of competition is a heightened sense of one’s own worth and rights as an isolated individual and a diminished perception of one’s role and duty as a member of a community. A deeper awareness of one’s rights and obligations in ordinary economic affairs, not the convenient rhetoric of “the invisible hand,” helps resolve the inevitable conflicts which individuals confront in the workplace and the marketplace which are changing continuously in response to entrepreneurial forces.

In this regard, the three principles of economic justice are especially instructive. First, economic justice governs the interaction between two parties in a marketplace or workplace exchange through the principle of equivalence which states that the two have an obligation to exchange things of equal value and to impose equal burdens on each other.⁶ Second, justice governs the relationship between superior and subordinate through the principle of distributive justice by affirming the obligation of the superior to distribute the benefits and the burdens of the group among its members in some equal fashion. Finally, economic justice governs the relationship of the individual to any group to which he/she belongs through the principle of contributive justice which states that insofar as the individual receives benefits from belonging to the group he/she has an obligation to maintain and support that group.

A market economy cannot operate successfully for long without the faithful practice of all three principles of justice. The marketplace and workplace tend to dysfunction whenever there is widespread ripping-off (failure to respect the demands of the principle of equivalence), commonplace discrimination and favoritism (breakdown in distributive justice), or a corrosive loss of a sense of belonging (individual members are unmindful of their obligations to the group).

These consequences follow because the three social values of freedom, community, and equality which support the three organizing principles of competition, cooperation, and intervention, in turn, rest on the three principles of economic justice. To explain, there is no true

economic freedom when economic exchange is fraught with ripping off. A community disintegrates when its members pay no heed to supporting it and maintaining it. Lastly, there is no authentic equality across the members of society when those with superior responsibilities use their power and influence to reserve the benefits of the group to a hand-picked few.

OTHER RIGHTS AND DUTIES SUSTAINING ORDER, PEACE, AND TRANQUILLITY

The rights and duties necessary for an orderly, peaceful, and tranquil human society are not prescribed fully by economic justice. Additional rights and duties are grounded in the very person of each human being, and require restatement here and re-affirmation in the European Union precisely because twentieth-century Europe is strewn with millions of human victims of regimes which have denied their dignity.⁷ Thus, every human being must be seen as a precious person whose elemental worth is an unchanging and unchangeable given which depends in no way on how much he/she contributes to economic affairs or on how many material possessions he/she may have. It will be necessary especially for public officials and church men and women to re-affirm the dignity of all human beings repeatedly not just because it has been breached so egregiously in the past in Europe but also because it is openly violated even today in parts of Europe under what is euphemistically called “ethnic cleansing.” To abridge the personhood of any one human being is to reject in effect the equality of all and condemns the Union to a future of deep-seated divisions and contentious power struggles.

Accordingly, even though labor and capital are alike in that both are instruments for the production of goods and services, labor is by far the more important. Capital is an inanimate object; labor is a living, breathing existential actuality. Human laborers are embodied, material creatures with rights because they alone are endowed with an intelligence and free will which differentiate them from all other creatures in the universe. Because they are most fundamentally persons and not objects, workers may not be enslaved, prostituted, reduced to sex objects, or otherwise used to manipulate others or be exploited in matters relating to wages, hours, or working conditions.

At times, human beings choose *knowingly and freely* to render themselves into objects, effectively disavowing their own dignity. This is, of course, an abuse of their freedom of choice in that their will does not follow their intelligence. Even so, this in no way justifies the rest of society accepting them as objects or, worse yet, taking advantage of them as objects. Personhood means that the freedom of every human being is affirmed and protected by certain rights, but no one has the right to deny either his/her own fundamental dignity or the dignity of others.

Proclaiming that all humans have worth beyond measure is an idle gesture, however, if it is not reinforced by a commitment to provision their physical needs. It follows logically and directly from their personhood that the principal goal of any economic system is to meet the physical needs of the population and to satisfy their wants. Thus, a key measure of the performance of the European Union is the numbers and proportions of persons and families living in poverty. This specific measurement of performance is more important than gross domestic product, consumer prices, balance of trade, factory orders and the like because these indicators measure performance in terms of things whereas poverty measures performance in

terms of human well-being.

A Right to What is Created, A Duty to Share

A person has a right to what he/she creates with his/her own hands. It is wrong to forcibly take possession of the fruits of a person's labor, even in the name of the common good, because depriving a person in this manner makes the task of providing for his/her own physical need and the need of any dependants more difficult. At the same time, a person has a duty to share the fruits of his/her labor with those who are not able to meet their own physical need without help. This duty includes the poor outside the European Union and calls for directly meeting their physical need today and for transferring to them the technology which will help them provide for themselves in the future. It is not discharged by means of the "invisible hand of the market." The right to private property based on the one's own productive efforts is subordinate the right of all humankind to the goods and services necessary to sustain and nurture life and required by their fundamental human dignity. Simply put, private property is a means to the end of sustaining human life and preserving human dignity and as such must never be allowed to dominate to that end.

A Right to Earn a Profit, A Duty to Meet the Needs of Others who Depend on the Firm

The right to private property includes the owners' right to any profits the company may earn. Additionally, there is no private job creation in the absence of profits. It follows that profit-bashing is no solution to the problems of persons and families left behind by the growth and development in Europe over the past 50 years. But this right is not absolute because profits are not an end in itself. They are instead a necessary condition for the survival of the firm and must be tempered by the demands placed on the owners by the principles of distributive justice and equivalence in dealing with their workers, suppliers, and customers, and by the principle of contributive justice in dealing with others in the same industry and markets. In this regard, there are particularly perplexing problems to be resolved relative to the right of workers to participate in the ownership of the firm and the rights of migrant workers, agricultural workers, the disabled, and working mothers.

A business enterprise is established not just for the sake of its owners but everyone whose livelihood depends on its success, most especially its workers, suppliers, customers, and competitors. This perspective on the private firm is a corollary to the view expressed above: the material goods of this world are intended for the use of all humankind. Whereas profits are necessary for the viability of the company, provisioning human material need is not to be sacrificed to maximizing profits if the fundamental equality of human beings is to be respected.

A Right to Work, A Duty to Work

Human material need is two-dimensional: physical need and the need for work as such. Humans work for the things they need to sustain and nurture life and for their own personal development. Their need for work as such derives from their need for opportunities to develop and apply their creative talents which is grounded in their individuality and from their need to belong which is rooted in their sociality. Since both dimensions of material need are based on their nature as human beings, men and women have a right to the means that meet those needs. They have a right to work. For the very same reason they have a duty to work. To reject this duty without cause is to claim that others have a duty to provision their physical need and also to deny

that work is central to their development as persons.

A Right to Associate, A Duty to Include

A person has a right to form workplace associations,⁸ and it is wrong to deny this right because, insofar as such associations help persons improve their skills, denial in effect deprives them of the additional fruits which would better provision their physical need and the need of others. A person has a duty not to arbitrarily exclude others from entering the workplace or any professional association and a duty not to use such associations exclusively for personal gain. Such exclusion or misuse frustrates others in meeting their need to belong as well as their physical need.

A Right to Participate, A Duty to Speak for Others

A person has a right to participate in decisions that bear upon his/her own physical need or need for work as a means for applying his/her creative talents and for belonging. It is wrong to shut off this participation except in an emergency when the good of the individual must be subordinated to the good of the many. Correspondingly, a person has a duty to use participation in decision making as an opportunity for expressing more than just self-interest. There is no “invisible hand” to automatically provide for others especially for those who are needier, weaker, or unable to speak for themselves.

A Right to Compete, A Duty to Cooperate

A person has a right to compete in order to be able to better provision his/her own physical need and the need of any dependants. It is wrong to bar a person from competing as a worker in the workplace or as a producer in the marketplace unless such competition does more harm than good. Given the role of competition in activating economic affairs and thereby provisioning human material need, any doubt as to whether competition does more harm than good probably should be resolved on the side of the good. A person has a duty to cooperate in the workplace and the marketplace because economic affairs are not activated by competition alone. An unwillingness to cooperate with others creates barriers to provisioning human material need by throttling back the engine of cooperation. Whereas arbitrarily restricting competition is an attack on the individuality of the person, failure to cooperate is a denial of the sociality of the person.

A Right to Choose Freely, A Duty to Choose Responsibly

Within the limits mentioned above, a person has a right to choose freely both the goods and services which meet his/her own physical need and the employer for whom to work or person to employ. It is wrong to dictate to a person the goods and services he/she may not consume unless there is some hazard from (1) excessive consumption which reduces that person to a mere material being or (2) careless consumption which endangers others or the environment. This right is not surrendered even when a person uses personal resources unwisely, provided his/her own need and the need of any dependants have been met adequately. Similarly, it is wrong to dictate to a worker the employer for whom to work,⁸ and to an employer the worker to be hired unless denying this right to choose is *necessary* to protect the common good in, say, a national emergency.

A person has a duty to choose responsibly. For the consumer, satisfying wants is subordinate to meeting needs: the consumer's duty to choose responsibly has greater weight than the right to choose foolishly. For the worker, the right to choose does not mean the right to be provisioned indefinitely until the perfect employer is found. For the employer, the right to choose the worker to be employed does not mean that a worker may be terminated for virtually any shortcoming or failure. The worker's and employer's duty to choose responsibly means that since human beings are imperfect their right to choose does not signify a right to a perfect employer or perfect worker.

A Right to Leisure, A Duty to Rest

Leisure is like work in that both help a human being become more fully a human person. But leisure is non-work activity which complements the human development occurring in the workplace and originating in work itself by "nourishing the health, happiness and fulfillment of the whole human person [in a way] that is not driven by duty, accomplishment, or productivity, time and activity that celebrate being human rather than having and consuming material things" [Stockhausen]. Human beings are more than just instruments of efficiency and profits. They are works of art in progress. They paint their own living portraits with work and leisure, becoming whole and complete, just as the artist creates a painting with brush and colors. And just as the artist may abandon the canvas before it is finished, humans may leave their own development arrested.

In the context of economic affairs, there are two chief threats to human development: disordered work and consumption. Both disorders are revealed in the workaholic and the compulsive consumer. To the one, working is everything. To the other, acquiring and having is everything. Neither one understands or values leisure. Both are like a canvas which a deranged artist has slashed with a knife, both are grotesque caricatures of what was meant to be. Repairing that torn canvas is the purpose of leisure. Thus there is not only a right to leisure which is widely recognized in the secular order especially in the form of vacation leave but also a duty to rest which for thousands of years has been expressed in the Sabbath.

IMPLEMENTING A VISION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

A vision for the European Union which emphasizes rights and duties but for which there are no realistic means of implementation is no vision at all. Indeed, it is a pipe dream which too easily frustrates men and women of vision, and which occasions ridicule among men and women of practical affairs. However, Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty itself provides a clue as to how a vision for the European Union can be successfully implemented -- the principle of subsidiarity.

The principle that decisions should be taken as close to the citizen as possible has become an overriding one in the last few years [European Communities 1996b, pg. 14]. Broadly construed, this principle states that larger, more powerful units in the social order should not usurp the functions of smaller, less powerful units but should instead provide assistance (*subsidiuum*) so that the smaller units can function effectively.⁹ By locating the assistance as close as possible to the person and the family -- the smallest units of society -- they have greater direct access to the persons who administer that assistance and therefore have greater opportunities to influence the decisions that bear directly on their need. In other words, the

principle of subsidiarity reinforces the democratic ideal of universal participation.

As already mentioned, economic decisions may be made by individuals acting independently (the *many*), or by acting together (the *one*). In market economies, group decision making may be either private or public. Individual decision making has the advantage of tailoring the decision to the specific needs and wants of each individual. It has the disadvantage of a narrow span of control which leaves the individual acting alone powerless to deal with certain problems. Group decision making has a wider span of control, allowing the group to address problems which are outside the control of the autonomous individual.

Wider span of control notwithstanding, *public* groups too often do not afford the individual any truly effective access to the decision-making process. *Private* groups occupy the middle ground giving them a wider span of control than individual decision making. The principle of subsidiarity gives preferences to private groups as opposed to public groups because, by being closer in the social order to the individual, private groups afford individuals a greater voice in the decisions that affect them.

By widening access to the decision-making process, private groups create opportunities to address the tension between the old ways and the new ways, between one right or duty and another, and to work out agreement as to how the conflicts are to be reconciled. Private-group decision making provides opportunities for addressing such values-laden issues as the place of *justice* and *charity* in economic affairs, the role of *property* rights versus *personal* rights, the meaning of *having* more versus *being* more, the difference between *need* and *want* especially as regards the poor, the scope of equality, freedom, and community in the workplace and the marketplace, and then implementing whatever agreements are forthcoming in a specific workplace, union, trade association, civic group, or neighborhood.

At the *intra*-firm level, there are numerous opportunities to implement private-group decision making. Four proven methods come to mind: quality circles, group safety awards, gain-sharing, and employee stock ownership. There are two other opportunities for private-group decision making which are consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. One operates at the *inter*-firm level and may be referred to as a “inter-firm partnership” which binds *two* autonomous business organizations by means of an formal agreement. One example is the partnership between a producer and his/her supplier in which the producer commits to purchasing from the supplier provided the supplier meets certain pre-determined standards such as on-time delivery and a specific defect rate. Such a partnership might include the producer providing technical and management assistance so that the supplier can meet the pre-determined performance standards. This type of partnership helps flesh out the meaning of the duty to meet the needs of others who depend on the firm for their livelihood.

The other operates at the *supra*-firm level and may be referred to as a “supra-firm alliance.” An alliance is a formal agreement which binds *more than two* autonomous business organizations in order to address certain common problems. One example is an alliance of firms and unions in the construction industry to address problems such as outdated work rules, jurisdictional disputes, and shortages of skilled workers.¹⁰ Another is an alliance of firms and their employees to assist one another in the event of an emergency such as a fire which if not

contained to the site could engulf nearby facilities.¹¹

Partnerships and alliances are *opportunities* for addressing problems which for one reason or another are outside the control of the individual firm operating alone. As with any group decision-making process the danger is that some of the affected parties will be excluded from the formal agreement in order to exploit them. The collusive price-fixing agreement which exploits consumers is a classic example of this type of private-group decision making. It follows that the parties to any partnership or alliance have an obligation to concentrate their group deliberations entirely on the solutions to their common problems, carefully avoiding all opportunities for exploiting the parties who are excluded.

Ultimately, however, the principle of subsidiarity alone is not enough to implement a vision for the European Union. Finally, it is a matter of men and women able and willing to look beyond the “endless arguments over how many carrots can be exported” and, as Havel says, see and long for a Europe which is a “*forum* of down-to-earth dialogue and effective cooperation between all its inhabitants in a commonly shared, commonly administered and commonly cultivated space dedicated to their existence and solidarity” [Havel, pg. 3; emphasis added].

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ENDNOTES

1. See O'Boyle (1997, pp. 364-82) for more on the revolutionary changes in traditional social values in the United States in recent years and how those changes influence economic affairs.

2. Production is the transformation of economic resources into goods and services; this process takes place in the workplace. Distribution is the movement of those goods and services through space and time from the workplace to the marketplace where they are transferred from those who made them to those who will use them. This transfer process is called exchange. Consumption is the actual use in the household of the goods and services produced in order to satisfy a human want or meet a human need.

3. Competition is a disposition on the part of the individual to undertake certain tasks individually for a specific, individual, economic return. Cooperation is a disposition on the part of the individual to undertake certain tasks collectively because the task can be done more efficiently acting collectively or because the task cannot be done at all by individual effort alone. Intervention is the imposition of limits on competition and cooperation by a private or public group in order to address certain abuses of excessive competition, such as suicidal price wars, or excessive cooperation, such as collusive price fixing.

4. In this analogy, the organizing principle of intervention may be thought of as the control surfaces of the aircraft, guiding it but not powering it in a given direction.

5. See, for example, measures being taken by the European Union to prevent overfishing [cf. European Communities 1996a, 15pp].

6. The European Union's "no compulsion principle" which assures that one party to an exchange cannot be forced to use the euro monetary unit during the 1998-2002 transition period gives practical expression to the principle of equivalence; so too does the suggested dual display of prices and wages [cf. European Communities 1997, pp. 12-13, 21, 24].

7. The European Commission affirms the fundamental rights of the human person but not fully in terms specific to the workplace and the marketplace [cf. European Commission, 8pp].

8. We include here as well the corollary right to strike.

9. Subsidiarity is affirmed explicitly in at least one other European Union document [cf. European Communities 1997, pg.14]. It is implicitly affirmed in one other document on the environment specifically (a) with regard to assistance to the four least developed Member States, and (b) along with the principle of cooperation, with regard to the roles of national governments and the entire European Community [cf. European Communities 1996c, pp. 4, 10].

10. One specific case of this type of alliance is PRIDE which provides a forum for the various parties to the construction industry in St. Louis, Missouri to address common problems and resolve conflicts.

11. A specific instance of this kind of alliance is CAER which formally commits 13 major chemical producers in Ascension Parish, Louisiana to come to one another's assistance in the event of a safety emergency.